Reflections on Constitutionalism on August 15

 On August 15, the 81st anniversary of the end of World War II, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement of fierce protest and condemnation regarding Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's ritual offering (玉串料 tamagushi-ryo) and her cabinet members' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, labeling it a “challenge to the post-war international order.”

the sunflower that’s taller than me

In considering this issue, I would first like to look back at its historical background. When Japan and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1972, China waived its demand for massive war reparations. This decision was grounded in the logic of separating the military from civilians, the idea that a handful of militarists who planned and led the war were the culprits, while the general Japanese public were victims. However, Class-A war criminals were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978—a fact that became widely known to the public through news reports in 1979. Consequently, Emperor Showa ceased his visits to the shrine. The situation escalated further in 1985 when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit, prompting explicit condemnation from China for the very first time.

Next, we need to understand the real nature of this problem. It is not a matter of diplomatic consideration for neighboring countries, but rather Japan’s legal constraints, such as the principle of separation of church and state. This is because, in order to ensure that constitutionalism functions properly and to maintain long-term social stability, those in power must also strictly adhere to these principles. 

Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the governments with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

(Quoted from “Federalist No. 25”)

Put another way, there is a good chance that public leaders' formal visits to Yasukuni Shrine are against the Japanese Constitution. Since the Religious Corporations Law was passed in 1951, Yasukuni Shrine has been formally recognized as a "religious corporation." Additionally, the Constitution's Article 20, Paragraph 3 clearly requires a rigorous separation of church and state,

Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.

2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.

3. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

In contrast, pre-war Imperial Japan relied on the sophistry known as the "Shrine Non-Religion Theory." The Meiji government positioned Shinto as the pillar of state governance, effectively On the other hand, pre-war Imperial Japan depended on a sophisticated theory called the "Shrine Non-Religion Theory(神社非宗教論)." State Shinto was essentially established by the Meiji government, which made Shinto the cornerstone of state rule. They said that “Shinto is not a religion, but a public teaching of the state (治教) based on reverence for the Emperor." They established shrines as public institutions by prohibiting Shinto priests from participating in obviously religious activities. As a result, the government was able to actively promote State Shinto while pretending that they were "not violating the separation of religion and state." Such perverted reasoning is obviously untenable in the present day.

Now, the principle of the separation of religion and state does not, in itself, directly guarantee individual rights. The prevailing constitutional interpretation is that while the first half of Article 20, Paragraph 1 directly guarantees the fundamental human right to "freedom of religion," the latter half of Paragraph 1, as well as Paragraph 3, serve as an "institutional guarantee." By legally securing the institutional separation of state and religion, they indirectly ensure freedom of religion.

The vulnerability of protecting rights indirectly through an institutional guarantee lies in the fact that the impending crisis remains largely invisible until an individual's rights are directly violated. A politician's visit to Yasukuni will not immediately take away our freedom of religion any time soon. But ignoring the deterioration of the institutional barrier between the state and religion may eventually allow the state to meddle in our deepest personal beliefs. As the sovereign people, we must hold our leaders responsible for ensuring that the Constitution is strictly adhered to and that no departure is allowed in order to safely safeguard the universal value of fundamental human rights.


Reflections on Constitutionalism on August 15

  On August 15, the 81st anniversary of the end of World War II, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement of fierc...